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ABSTRACT: This paper is concerned with the paradox of decrease. Its aim is to defend the 
answer to this puzzle that was propounded by its originator, namely, the Stoic philoso-
pher Chrysippus. The main trouble with this answer to the paradox is that it has the 
seemingly problematic implication that a material thing could perish due merely to ex-
trinsic change. (For, intuitively, it is not possible for a mere extrinsic change to cause a 
material thing to cease to be.) It follows that in order to defend Chrysippus’ answer to 
the paradox, one has to explain how it could be that Theon is destroyed by the amputa-
tion without changing intrinsically. In this paper, I shall answer this challenge by  
appealing to the broadly Aristotelian idea that at least some of the proper parts of a  
material substance are ontologically dependent on that substance. I will also appeal to 
this idea in order to offer a new solution to the structurally similar paradox of increase. 
In this way, we will end up with a unified solution to two structurally similar paradoxes.  
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…the semicircle is defined by the circle; and so is the finger by 
the whole body, for a finger is such and such a part of a man. 
 
                                    —     Aristotle, Metaphysics, : b— 
 
 
  Introduction 
 
This paper is concerned with an ancient puzzle: the paradox of decrease. Consider 
Dion, a human being, and Theon, one of Dion’s large proper parts, identical to all of 
Dion besides his left foot. Suppose that Dion’s left foot is amputated, and that Dion 
survives. (Suppose also that Dion undergoes no further mereological change.) Intui-
tively, Theon survives in this scenario as well as Dion; after all, Theon only undergoes 
  
extrinsic change. However, if this is right, it follows that post-amputation, Dion and 
Theon end up composed of the very same matter, whilst occupying exactly the same 
region of space. Intuitively, however, it is not possible for two material objects to oc-
cupy precisely the same spatial region, or be composed of the very same matter, at 
once.
1
 
 In general, the paradox of decrease arises because, across a range of cases, it seems 
possible for an object to lose a proper part and thereby become coincident with (what 
once was) the complement of that part. Yet at the same time, it does not seem possi-
ble for distinct material objects to come to be related in this way. The case of Dion 
and Theon is an instance of this more general problem. To solve it, we must either 
find a way to make palatable the claim that an object and (what once was) one of its 
proper parts might come to coincide spatially and materially, or else resist the reason-
ing which implies that this could happen. That is, we need either to explain how it 
could be that Dion and Theon end up being coincident, or else find some way of 
denying that this is the situation that the amputation would engender.  
 Many philosophers pursue the former strategy. However, aside from the intuitive 
case against coincident objects, this response faces two further problems. First, there 
is a worry concerning how a single set of material parts could possibly compose two 
distinct material things at once. For prima facie, at least, it is not possible for this to 
happen (cf. Lewis: , p. ; Noonan: , p. ). Second, and perhaps more 
seriously, there is the so-called ‘grounding problem’. To illustrate, suppose for in-
                                                   
1. Interestingly, the intuitive ban on material coincidence is echoed throughout the entire history 
of philosophy (cf. Betegh: ). Of course, some philosophers do believe that material coincidence is 
possible. However, it seems to me that the intuition against the possibility of material coincidence is 
sufficiently strong to make it so that the Dion/Theon story constitutes a genuine paradox.  
 
  
stance that both Dion and Theon survive the amputation, and thus end up being co-
incident. Then notice that after the amputation (as before), Dion and Theon differ in 
certain salient ways. For example, after the amputation, Dion is a person, whilst The-
on is not (cf. Burke: a). The trouble is that it seems hard to see what could pos-
sibly ground the difference in personhood between Dion and Theon at this time, giv-
en that they are composed of the same matter, and hence have precisely the same mi-
crophysical properties. The proponent of the coincidence view thus seems forced to 
maintain (as Bennett:  puts it) that there can be brute differences in ‘sor- talish’ 
properties (such as personhood) between distinct material things. Yet this commit-
ment seems implausible, as several philosophers have noted (see e.g. Burke: , 
Fine: , and Olson: ).
2
 
 ht of these problems, it seems worthwhile to pursue an alternative strategy. There 
are several options that might be considered here, but in this paper, my goal is to de-
fend the position advocated by the originator of the puzzle, namely, the Stoic known 
as Chrysippus.
3
 What Chrysippus contends, essentially, is that whilst Dion survives 
the amputation, Theon does not. Philo of Alexandria summarises the position thus:  
 
The question arises which one has perished, and [Chrysippus’] claim is that Theon is 
the stronger candidate…[But] how can it be that Theon, who has had no part chopped 
off, has been snatched away, while Dion, whose foot has been amputated, has not per-
ished? ‘Necessarily’, says Chrysippus, ‘For Dion, the one whose foot has been cut off, 
                                                   
2 There is in fact an extensive body of literature concerned with this problem. Some of the key 
texts here include: Burke (), Bennett (), deRossett (), Fine (), Moyer (), Ol-
son (), Sider (), Wasserman (), and Zimmerman (). 
3 For a useful account of the full range of options for interpreting the Dion and Theon paradox 
see Burke (a). For further discussion of the paradox see Burke (a, ), Carter (),  
Olson (), Sidelle (), Sider (), Stone (), Parsons (), and van Inwagen (). 
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has collapsed into the defective substance of Theon…Therefore it is necessary that Dion 
remains whilst Theon has perished’ (Long & Sedley: , pp.  —)  
 
An important problem with this answer to the paradox, as Philo himself points out, 
is its implication that a material thing could be destroyed by a mere extrinsic change. 
For, intuitively, no extrinsic or ‘mere Cambridge’ change could cause a material thing 
to cease to be (cf. van Inwagen: , p. ). Accordingly, in order to defend the 
view that Theon perishes, one has to explain how it is possible for the amputation to 
destroy Theon, despite changing Theon only extrinsically.  
 In this paper, I develop a novel answer to this challenge, which appeals to a 
broadly neo-Aristotelian mereological framework. The result, I contend, is a novel 
and attractive account of the paradox of decrease.
4
 
 At the heart of my proposal is that idea at least some of the parts of material sub-
stances are dependent parts, which ontologically depend upon their proper wholes. 
The central claim is that since Theon is a dependent part of Dion, it follows that for 
Theon to exist, it is necessary for Dion to exist and have a certain structure. Given 
this view, I claim, we can explain why the amputation destroys Theon, despite chang-
ing Theon only extrinsically. In particular, we will be able to explain why this is so in 
terms of the intrinsic, structural change that Dion undergoes. The core idea is that 
because Theon is a dependent part of Dion, Theon is unable to survive the change in 
structure that the amputation constitutes for Dion, Theon’s proper whole. 
                                                   
4 The Chrysippian view that Theon perishes has also been defended by Burke (a, , 
). In this paper, I do not engage with Burke’s view directly. (But for critical discussion see: 
Carter:  Stone:  Olson: a, and Sider: . See also Moran: manuscript.) I do in fact 
believe that my account of the paradox is preferable to Burke’s. However,  I do not argue for that here. 
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 As we will see, this proposed answer also suggests a parallel solution to a related 
puzzle, known as the paradox of increase. (For contemporary discussion of this puzzle 
see Chisholm: , p. ff and Olson: ; , Ch. ..) This puzzle turns on 
a variant case, in which Dion is born without a left foot, before having one surgically 
attached later on. Intuitivley, once the new foot is attached, Dion should end up with 
a large proper part comprising all of Dion minus the new foot. Let us again refer to 
this part as ‘Theon’. The question is whether or not Theon exists prior to the surgery. 
If Theon is already there, then we again have to make sense of coincident objects. 
Furthermore, we face the difficulty of explaining why it is that Dion grows when the 
new foot is attached whilst Theon does not. However, it is equally hard to see how 
Theon could be brought into being when the new foot is attached. How could at-
taching a foot thereby create the corresponding foot-complement? Attaching a foot to 
something seems like a strange way to create a further object, of which the foot is not 
even a part.
5
 
 What I will argue is that this puzzle can be adequately resolved once we conceive 
of Theon as a dependent part of Dion. In particular, I shall argue that once we think 
of Theon as ontologically dependent on Dion in the relevant way, we will be able to 
make perfect sense of how, in this variant case, attaching a new foot to Dion brings 
Theon into being.  
 The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I set out my proposed view 
of the paradox of decrease, which aims to vindicate Chrysippus’ claim that Theon 
perishes despite undergoing only extrinsic change (§). In the following section, I 
                                                   
5 Cf. Olson (, pp. —); ‘If conjoining two objects adds anything to the furniture of 
the earth, it ought to be something made up of those two objects. We don’t expect it to create a new 
thing that is just like one of the original things was before the attachment.’ 
  
then explain how my proposed account of the paradox of decrease can be extended to 
the related paradox of increase (§). The final section of the paper concludes (§). 
 
  Dependent Parts 
 
In this section, my aim is to offer an explanation as to how it could be that Theon 
gets destroyed by a mere extrinsic change. As we will see, this view depends upon a 
background mereological framework, which is broadly Aristotelian in character,  
according to which material substances may have both independent and dependent 
parts. 
 Broadly speaking, the independent parts of a substance are those which can exist 
regardless of whether or not the substance that they are contingently part of exists. 
For example, the particles that now compose me are among my independent parts. 
Pretty much all contemporary philosophers allow that objects have independent parts 
(if they have parts at all). In my view, however, certain material substances also have 
dependent parts, which can exist so long as the substance they are a part of both ex-
ists and has a certain structure. Paradigm examples of such dependent parts are the 
arbitrary spatial parts of a substance, such as all of me besides my left index finger, or 
all of Plato besides his beard. What is distinctive of such parts, as Lowe (, p. ) 
puts it, is that ‘[their] very identities are dependent upon the persisting objects to 
which they…belong’.
6
 Unlike the independent parts of an object, then, dependent 
                                                   
6 The notion of a dependent part has historical precedent. Indeed Aristotle, at least in The Meta-
physics, may be read as claiming that all of the parts of a material substance are dependent parts of it, 
which can exist only so long as they stand in certain distinctive relations to that very substance  (cf. 
Scaltsas:  and Koslicki: , VI; see also Hoffman & Rosenkrantz:  for a contemporary 
version of this Aristotelian view). However, it seems to me that this view is rather radical. After all, I 
am a material substance, and I am composed of various particles—but surely these particles are not 
  
parts are in effect abstractions from the whole itself.
7
 They are, so to speak, merely ‘di-
vided out of’ the relevant whole, and in this way presuppose its existence.  
 In contemporary terminology, (which is itself broadly Aristotelian in flavour), the 
notion of a dependent part may be stated by means of the notion of ‘real definition’ 
(see Fine: , , Johnston: , Rosen: ). To give the real definition of a 
thing is to specify what it is for that thing to exist—it is to specify the conditions un-
der which we have something that is that very being. It is when these conditions are 
met, and only when these conditions are met, that the relevant item exists. The 
thought is that when it comes to dependent parts, their real definition has to mention 
the material substance that they are a part of. For again, if something is a dependent 
part, then what it is for that thing to exist is for its proper whole to exist and have a 
certain mereological structure. 
 The view that we must recognise both independent and dependent parts has re-
cently been defended by both Lowe (, esp. p. ff) and Johnston (, ). 
Here I will follow Johnston’s presentation. In this way, the hope is to bring the no-
tion of a dependent part more clearly into focus.
8
 
 According to Johnston, each kind of substance is associated with a distinctive 
principle of unity (or principle of composition) by means of which it is constructed. 
                                                                                                                                          
dependent beings that exist only when I do, and which depend for their being upon me. Accordingly, 
it seems to me preferable to recognise that material substances can have both dependent and inde-
pendent parts.   
7 Cf. Schaffer (, p. ) who speaks of the derivative parts as mere shards of the whole, ob-
tained from the whole by abstraction. (For Schaffer, every material thing there is, besides the cosmos 
itself, is a mere shard in this sense, i.e., a dependent being which is abstracted from the cosmos as a 
whole.) 
8 Note that while I am drawing on Johnston’s mereological views, I do not claim that Johnston 
would accept my purported solution to the paradox of decrease. What is more likely, in fact, given his 
commitments elsewhere, is that Johnston would accept the ‘coincidentalist’ interpretation, according 
to which Theon and Dion both survive, and end up both spatially and materially coincident (cf. §) 
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The things to which this principle applies, moreover, are the independent parts of 
that substance. Specifying the real definition for a given type of substance is then a 
matter of specifying its principle of unity, and also the types of independent part to 
which that principle of unity needs to apply if the relevant substance is to exist. As an 
example, Johnston considers the real definition of a hydrochloride molecule. He 
writes: 
 
Consider HCl, a kind of molecule. The principle of unity for individual hydrogen chlo-
ride (HCl) molecules is the relation of bipolar bonding. So consider a particular HCl 
molecule, whose genuine parts involve a hydrogen ion (H+) and a chlorine ion (Cl-). 
The principle of unity holds of the ions, and its holding is the essential condition for 
the existence of the molecule…[W]hat it is for a given hydrogen chloride molecule to 
be is for there to be a hydrogen ion and a chlorine ion together in a bipolar bond…[I]t 
follows that bipolar bonding is a principle of unity for hydrogen chloride molecules. 
(, p. )  
 
In general, according to Johnston, when x is a complex whole of a certain kind, we 
can provide a real definition of x, (i.e. an account of what it is for x to be), in terms of 
(i) its characteristic principle of unity and (ii) its independent parts.   
 One way to think of this is as follows. Take any substantial whole, W. Then take 
the independent parts of W, and ‘apply’ to those parts the relevant principle of unity. 
The ‘result’ of doing so will be the whole itself. For, what it is for W to be just is for 
the principle of unity to apply to those parts. If the independent parts are the Xs, and 
the principle of composition is ∑, then what it is for W to be is for ∑ to be satisfied 
by the Xs. (What it is for ∑ to be satisfied by the Xs is, moreover, for the Xs to satisfy 
a certain complex relational condition.) 
  
 Now in addition to independent parts and principles of composition, we must on 
Johnston’s view also recognise dependent parts and principles of decomposition. In 
general, whilst independent parts genuinely compose a substance, by means of the 
relevant principle of unity, the dependent parts of an item are mere arbitrary parts 
that are disclosed by a principle of division or decomposition. So whereas the inde-
pendent parts are prior to the whole, which genuinely compose it via an appropriate 
principle of unity, the dependent parts are posterior to the whole, which are merely 
‘divided out of it’ via a principle of division: 
 
…we have a dependent part of an item when we have a part of an item disclosed by a 
principle of division…By contrast, non-dependent parts of an item are those distinct 
items that are the relata of a…principle of unity for the item in question. An item is 
genuinely composed out of its non-dependent parts, whereas its dependent parts pre-
suppose and are merely divided out of the item itself. (, p. )
9
 
 
Johnston goes on to say that principles of unity and division can be thought of as as-
sociated with generative functions: 
 
 …whereas a principle of unity can be thought of as associated with a function from 
given items to another item that those items make up, a principle of division is associat-
ed with a function from a given item to items that make up the given item. (, p. 
) 
 
                                                   
9 For present purposes, we need not recognise any distinction between ‘non-dependent’ and ‘in-
dependent’ parts. Rather, we can treat these terms as synonyms. (Johnston, however, in fact allows for 
a distinction here, in order to allow for symmetric dependence, i.e. in order to be able to claim that 
some parts are non-dependent without being independent, due to both depending on the whole and 
also being such that the whole depends on them. But we need not worry about this here.) 
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Thus, whilst we move from the independent parts to the whole via a principle of uni-
ty, we move to the dependent parts from the whole via a principle of division. The 
whole is thus constructed from its independent parts, whilst the dependent parts are 
abstracted from the whole. 
 This way of putting things is somewhat metaphorical. There is no temporal pro-
cess by means of which we move from the independent parts to the whole, or from 
the whole to the dependent parts. Rather, this talk of movement is supposed to indi-
cate the order of dependence. We move from the independent parts to the whole be-
cause the independent parts are prior to the whole and genuinely compose it. Where-
as we move from the dependent parts to the whole because the dependent parts are 
posterior to the whole and can exist only because the relevant whole exists and exem-
plifies a certain structure. 
 In the same way, talk of dividing a dependent part out of a whole is also some-
what metaphorical. The claim is not that a dependent exists only when someone lit-
erally divides a whole into those parts. Rather, talk of division is supposed to high-
light the way in which the dependent parts of a substance are posterior to it. The real 
definition of a substance is to be given in terms of its independent parts and a princi-
ple of unity for substances of the relevant kind. Thus the whole is defined in terms of 
its independent parts, and not the other way around. However, the dependent parts 
of a substance are defined in terms of that substance itself. What it is for a dependent 
part to be is just for the relevant substance to have the relevant mereological structure. 
It is by virtue of having this structure that the substance satisfies the relevant princi-
ple of division, i.e. the principle of division or decomposition by means of which 
those dependent parts are disclosed. 
  
 An example should help to illustrate the distinction between independent and 
dependent parts. There is an intuitive sense in which the bricks from which a house is 
made are independent of the house; they existed before the house was built, and 
could well continue on existing without the house. (Imagine, for instance, that the 
house is carefully dismantled brick by brick.) Therefore, we should count the bricks 
as being amongst the independent parts of the house. These are a set of parts from 
which the house is genuinely constructed, via an appropriate principle of unity. But 
now consider that part of a house comprising all of it besides one arbitrary segment 
towards the bottom left corner of the front-facing wall. (This is a part, of course, for 
which we have no name in ordinary English.) Intuitively, this arbitrary part did not 
pre-date the house, and, moreover, could not go on existing without it. It thus ap-
pears that we should count this arbitrary spatial part as being amongst its dependent 
parts.
10
 On this view, the arbitrary part is not amongst a set of parts that genuinely 
composes the house via an appropriate principle of composition or unity. Rather, the 
arbitrary part is ‘divided out of’ the house itself, via an appropriate principle of divi-
sion. This means that what it is for that part to exist is for the house to exist and ex-
emplify a certain structure. The real definition of the arbitrary part thus makes essen-
tial reference to the house itself, and to the structure it exemplifies. To specify what it 
is for that part to be, we must mention the house itself. 
 In fact, arbitrary parts like the part of the house just mentioned are the dependent 
parts par excellence. As Johnston writes: 
                                                   
10 In discussion, I have come across colleagues who do not share this intuition. Presumably, these 
philosophers will not find intuitive the more general distinction between independent and dependent 
parts either. To these philosophers I say that even so, this distinction might still be worth accepting. 
For in accepting it, we end up with a unified and attractive solution to two difficult (and related) par-
adoxes, namely, the paradoxes of decrease and increase. 
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A paradigm of a mere principle of division is arbitrary spatial or temporal segmentation. 
You take a spatially extended item, say a material object, and divide it into as many fi-
ne-grained spatial slices as you like. These arbitrary undetached spatial parts of the ma-
terial object typically will be mere dependent parts. (, p. ) 
 
In general, it seems, all that it takes for the arbitrary undetached parts of a substance 
to exist is for the relevant substance to exemplify the relevant structure. If that is so, 
then so long as the relevant substance exists, and remains structurally the same, the 
dependent part will continue to exist. With an appropriate change in structure, how-
ever, the dependent part would cease to be. 
 The following serves as a general formula for providing the real definition of a 
dependent part. We take the proper whole, W, and the dependent part in question, 
X, and then we take an appropriate principle of division, ∆X, which is to be applied to 
that proper whole. What it is for X to exist is then for ∆X to apply to W. (What it is 
for ∆X to apply to W, moreover, is for W to exemplify a certain shape or structure.) It 
follows that dependent parts always depend for their existence on the existence and 
structure of their proper wholes. 
 Take Johnston’s example involving the lower-half of a human being. According 
to Johnston, the lower half of a person is a mere dependent part. This is because all it 
takes for that part to exist is for the person to exist and to exhibit a certain structure. 
As Johnston writes: ‘What it is for the…lower half of a person’s flesh to exist is for 
the person’s flesh to exist and for it to have a lower half…’ (, p. ). In our 
terminology, this view can be stated as follows. If H is the lower-half of a given per-
son, P, then what it is for H to exist is for a given principle of division, ∆H, to apply 
  
to P. What is it is for this principle of division to apply to P, moreover, is for P to 
have the appropriate structure. In particular, P has to be such that a lower-half of 
flesh can be discerned.
11
 
 Return now to the case of Dion and Theon. As a mere arbitrary undetached spa-
tial part of Dion, we can maintain that Theon is a merely dependent part, which is 
‘divided out of’ Dion by a principle of decomposition. On this view, what it is for 
Theon to exist is for Dion to exist and have a certain structure. For Theon just is, in its 
nature, that part of Dion which consists of all of Dion besides his left foot. To cap-
ture this more precisely, let ‘∆T’ denote the relevant principle of division for Theon. 
We can then say that what it is for Theon to exist is for ∆T to apply to Dion, Theon’s 
proper whole.  
 Given this view of Theon, it is possible to explain why Theon perishes due to the 
amputation. The reason why Theon perishes is that Theon can no longer be divided 
out of Dion post-amputation. For, when you divide a whole along its own spatial di-
mensions, you obtain only the whole itself. That is, you do not obtain a dependent part 
of that whole. For there is, so to speak, nothing to divide that part out of. (Trying to 
divide Theon out of Dion post-amputation would be like to trying to divide a hemi-
sphere out of a sphere that has already been sliced in half.) In short, whilst Dion still 
has his left foot, he has the kind of structure out of which Theon can be divided. Af-
ter the operation, however, this is no longer so. 
12
 
                                                   
11 Cf. Lowe’s example involving the top inch of a wooden pole (Lowe: , p. ). As Lowe 
notes, it is plausible to think that for this item to exist, it is sufficient for the pole to exist and to exem-
plify a certain (spatial) structure. 
12 It is common to view entities like Theon as mere aggregates or mere mereological sums, which 
necessarily continue to exist so long as the relevant particles from which they are composed continue 
to exist (and, perhaps, be arranged in the relevant way). Given this conception of Theon, it would 
indeed be hard to see how it could fail to survive the amputation. On my view, however, Theon is no 
  
 We can put matters this way. Before the amputation, the principle of division for 
Theon, ∆T, applies to Dion; that is, the conditions on Theon’s existence are met. 
However, after the operation, ∆T does not apply to Dion; and so the conditions on 
Theon’s existence are not met. Accordingly, Theon does not survive the operation. 
For, whilst Theon does not undergo any intrinsic change, Dion does undergo such 
change. And it is this intrinsic change to Dion—a change which alters Dion’s shape 
or structure—that prevents Theon from continuing to exist. 
 This, then, is the proposed answer to the explanatory challenge with which we 
started, i.e., that of explaining how a mere extrinsic change could cause Theon’s de-
mise. The view is that the amputation, which constitutes a mere extrinsic change for 
Theon, also constitutes an intrinsic change to Dion, one which alters Dion’s mereo-
logical structure. This intrinsic, structural change to Dion is then what brings it 
about that the dependent part, Theon, does not continue to exist. 
 The upshot is that Chrysippus’ answer to the paradox can be vindicated. What we 
can claim is that, whilst Dion survives the amputation, the same cannot be said of 
Theon, given Theon’s status as a dependent part. For since Theon is a dependent part 
of Dion, which cannot therefore survive certain intrinsic changes to its proper whole, 
it follows that Theon is unable to survive the amputation. And this entails the view 
that Chrysippus defends, namely that whilst Dion survives, Theon does not.  
 In the following section, I will explain how it is possible to extend this reply to a 
related and structurally similar puzzle, known as the paradox of increase. Before that, 
however, I want to address a couple of worries that one might have regarding my 
proposed answer to the paradox of decrease. 
                                                                                                                                          
mere aggregate or sum. Rather, it is a dependent part of Dion, which can exist only if Dion has the 
requisite structure. And this why Theon does not survive the amputation of Dion’s left foot. 
  
 The first concern I want to address is whether or not my proposed interpretation 
of the Dion/Theon story really does furnish us with a general solution to the paradox 
of decrease. At the start of this paper (§), I noted that the Dion/Theon case is just 
one instance of a more general problem, which arises across a whole range of cases.  
The present question, then, is whether or not my view of the Dion/Theon case will 
generalise, so that we end up with a general solution to the paradox of decrease, ra-
ther than a more limited solution that applies only to certain cases.  
 In general, the paradox of decrease arises whenever we have a material substance 
O with some proper part P and some larger proper part O-P (whereby O-P compris-
es all of O besides P), such that O could lose P without ceasing to be. The worry is 
that if indeed O loses P, then since material things like O-P necessarily survive extrin-
sic change, both O and O-P will survive O’s loss of P, so that O will come to be co-
incident with O-P, despite the fact that intuitively, it is not possible for distinct ma-
terial things to be related in this way (cf. §).  
 Again, the Dion/Theon story is one instance of this more general puzzle. What I 
maintain is that since Theon is a dependent part of Theon (in the relevant sense), we 
can plausibly claim that Theon is in fact destroyed by the amputation, despite only 
undergoing extrinsic change, which means that we do not end up with coincident 
things. It should be clear, however, that if this answer to the Dion/Theon puzzle is 
going to generalise, then it has to be plausible to maintain that in all the relevant cas-
es, we can plausibly view the large proper part, O-P, (whatever exactly it is) as a  
dependent part of O (whatever exactly it is), which can exist only so long as O has a 
certain structure. One might, however, worry whether it really will be plausible to say 
this of O-P across the whole range of relevant cases.    
  
 As it turns out, it can be argued that my solution does indeed generalise. To do 
this, we must appeal to two ideas. The first idea we’ve already encountered. This is 
the thought that the arbitrary undetached spatial parts of a substance are paradigmat-
ic cases of dependent parts (cf. again Johnston: , p. ) The second idea is that 
whenever we have an instance of the paradox of decrease—i.e., a case wherein some 
material substance O has a proper part P and a proper part O-P, whereby O can lose 
P without ceasing to exist—it will invariably turn out that O-P is an arbitrary unde-
tached spatial part of P. The point is that once we put these two ideas together, then 
we end up with a principled reason for thinking that across all the relevant cases, we 
can conceive of the large proper part O-P as being a dependent part of the relevant 
material substance, O. But if that is right, then my answer to the Dion/Theon cases 
does indeed generalise.  
 There is one further point that is worth making here. This is that the Dion/Theon 
story (at least as I am thinking about matters) is a paradigmatic, and thus representa-
tive, instance of the paradox of decrease. For what this seems to show is that it is, at 
the very least, a plausible working hypothesis that any successful account of the  
Dion/Theon case can be extended to the other instances of the paradox. My present 
point is that if this is right, then this constitutes further reason for thinking that my 
proposed solution constitutes a fully general response to the paradox, rather than be-
ing a more limited response that only deals with one specific case. The burden of 
proof, therefore, I think lies squarely with the objector, to locate an instance of the 
paradox that cannot be resolved by claiming that O-P is a dependent part of O.
13
 
                                                   
13 A final point is worth making here is this. Suppose we grant that in at least certain cases, we 
cannot to claim that O-P is a dependent part of O. It seems to me that even if this were the case 
(though I deny that we must grant it is), we could remain confident that there is at least a large class of 
  
 I want now to consider a second, related worry about my proposed account. This 
concerns whether, even granting everything I say about the Dion/Theon story, we 
might still be able to generate instances of the paradox. Let us focus on one specific 
instance of this worry. 
 To capture the claim that Theon is a dependent part of Dion, which is the kind 
of thing that can exist only when Dion has a certain structure, I have claimed that we 
can think of Theon as the output of a certain decomposition function ∆T (as applied 
to Dion). The core idea is that since this function fails to yield any entity after the 
amputation (due to the fact that Dion has the wrong structure), we can explain why 
Theon perishes. One might worry, however, that there is nothing to stop us from 
recognising a more lenient decomposition function ‘ΩX’, which, like the original 
function, delivers an entity that occupies Theon’s location before the amputation, but 
which also, unlike the original function, still delivers an entity even after the amputa-
tion has taken place. The trouble is that if there is an entity whose real definition can 
be given in terms of this more lenient function, then will still end up facing an in-
stance of the original paradox, the claim that Theon is a dependent part of Dion 
notwithstanding. For this entity will exist before the amputation, and will moreover 
continue to exist afterwards, and so will end up coincident Dion.  
 The problem with this objection, it seems to me, is this. For the objection to suc-
ceed, it would have to be the case that we must recognise an entity whose real defini-
tion can be given in terms of the new decomposition function ΩX. For it is only if 
                                                                                                                                          
cases, which are all putative instances of the puzzle, wherein we can plausibly view O-P as a mere de-
pendent part of O. If that is right, however, then my response to the Dion/Theon case can at the least 
be generalised across this class of cases. But this already seems like genuine progress, even if it does 
turn out that there are some instances of the paradox that we have yet to adequately resolve.  
 
  
there is such an entity, call it ‘X’, that we once more end up with the threat of coin-
cidence post-amputation. It seems to me, however, that there is no good motivation 
for believing that any such entity exists.  
 To see why this seems right, note that if X exists at all, it is distinct from Theon. 
This is because Theon and X have different properties: X can survive the amputation 
whilst Theon cannot. It follows that if we believe that X exists, then this is tanta-
mount to holding that in addition to Theon, there is another entity with which The-
on is coincident, even before the amputation, whereby this entity is defined by the 
more lenient function ΩX, and hence will continue to exist after the amputation. But 
why should we believe in any such being? There is, it seems to me, some pressure to 
think that Theon exists.14 However, once we have recognised this much, what reason 
is there for thinking that there is also a further entity, X, which is really defined by 
the more lenient function ΩX (and which, therefore, is distinct from but coincident 
with Theon)? 
 One would of course have to accept this if one held the for every available  
essence, there is an actual object that has it, so that we end up with a plenitude of ob-
jects.
15
 For given this view of matters, then just as there is an entity (Theon) whose 
real definition is given by the more stringent decomposition function ∆T, so too there 
                                                   
14 What exactly is the pressure to believe that Theon exists? This seems to me to derive from two 
ideas. First, that everyday ontology recognises entities such as hands and feet, etc. Second, that it 
would be intolerably arbitrary to believe in hands and feet but not in the complements thereof. It fol-
lows that if we are to hold on to the commitments of ordinary ontology (and I assume that there is 
good reason to do this), then must recognise entities such as Theon exist (cf. here Olson: ; van 
Inwagen: ). As this brings out, the pressure to believe in Theon does not derive from the doctrine 
that any for set of parts whatever, that set of parts has an arbitrary mereological sum. For in my view 
this doctrine is implausible, and there are good reasons to be suspicious of it, cf. here fn.  above.) 
15 For recent defenses of this kind of plenitudinous ontology see for example Hawthorne (), 
Johnston (), and Yablo (), amongst several others. (For an account as to how we can avoid 
having to accept this view in the face of arguments from arbitrariness and the like see Korman: .) 
  
must be a further entity (X) whose real definition is given by the more lenient de-
composition function ΩX.
16
 It is unclear, however, where exactly this gets us. For the 
idea that for every essence, there is an actual object that has it, is a radical view, with 
various paradoxical consequences.
17
 It seems therefore far from incumbent on us to 
accept it. (There may even be positive reason for rejecting it.) However, if we do not 
accept this view, then we appear to lack adequate reason to think that X exists. But 
this means that the present objection does not get off the ground.
18
 
 I conclude, then, that we can plausibly take my proposed response to the  
Dion/Theon puzzle as illustrative of a more general approach to solving the paradox 
of decrease. Moreover, I conclude we can plausibly claim that if we adopt the adver-
tised mereological framework, then instances of the paradox are not going to arise. 
 
  The Paradox of Increase 
 
                                                   
16 “I am assuming here that the ‘available essences’ are just those essences (or real definitions) that 
it is metaphysically possible for an entity to have. For it is only with this assumption in the back-
ground (plus the further premise that both the more stringent decomposition function and the more 
lenient one deliver metaphysically possible essences), that the realisation of all available essences entails 
the conclusion that both Theon and X exist. (Thanks to Ralf Bader for helpful discussion here.) 
17 For instance, as Sosa () notes, this view implies that there is an ‘explosion of reality’, i.e., 
that there are vastly more entities in existence than commonsense supposes. In addition, this view 
gives rise to the problem of many persons (see Chihara: ), and, relatedly, the problem of per-
sonites (see Johnston: ). We therefore seem to have good reason to avoid accepting this position.   
18 N.b. also that there is something dialectically off about appealing to this plenitudinous ontology 
in the present context. As I mentioned at the outset of the paper (§), my aim here is to offer a solu-
tion to the paradox of decrease that does not require us to believe in material coincidence. But anyone 
who believes that every available essence is realised must be a believer in coincidence—indeed she has 
to hold that every matter-filled spatial region is literally packed with distinct material things (cf. Ben-
nett: ). So insofar as we feel the need to offer a solution to the paradox of decrease that does not 
appeal to material coincidence, we should also be disinclined to hold that for every available essence, 
there is an actual object that has it. Thus, it does not seem dialectically effective in the present context 
to appeal to a theory which entails that material coincidence is indeed possible (due to being actual). 
  
The answer to the paradox of decrease that I defend in this paper (§) appeals to the 
idea that material wholes have both independent and dependent parts. In this section 
of the paper, I shall argue that by appealing once again to this idea, we can offer a 
parallel solution to the related and structurally similar paradox of increase. 
 Consider a variation on the original Dion and Theon puzzle (the one that we 
mentioned towards the end of §.) This time, we imagine that Dion is born without 
a left foot. He then at some later time has a left foot surgically attached. After the 
surgery, it is true to say of Dion that he possesses a large proper part, which compris-
es all of Dion minus his newly acquired left foot. Let us refer to this part once more 
as ‘Theon’. 
 The question is, did Theon exist before the surgery? If the answer is yes, then we 
must say that prior to the foot being grafted on, Dion and Theon were in exactly the 
same place at exactly the same time, composed of exactly the same matter. But this is 
just as problematic as saying that Dion and Theon end up coincident post-
amputation in the original case. So it appears we have to say that Theon is created by 
the surgery, and so did not exist before it. However, this also leaves us facing a prob-
lem, viz., that of explaining how attaching a new foot to Dion could bring it about 
that a further object, which is roughly the same size as Dion, comes into being. For is 
it not somewhat mysterious to suppose that in giving Dion a new left foot we thereby 
create a further material object, one which does not even have that foot as a part? 
 This puzzle—the paradox of increase—is of course structurally similar to the par-
adox of decrease we have been considering. Accordingly, it would be natural to think 
we can offer a unified solution to these problems. (Despite this, I do not know of one 
  
that has been explicitly offered in the literature.) I will now show that in light of our 
response to the paradox of decrease, we can indeed offer a unified solution.  
 Given our theory of dependent parts, we can defuse the paradox of increase in the 
following way. What we can say is that whilst Theon is indeed created by the act of 
attaching the new left foot to Dion, there is nothing mysterious about this occur-
rence. On the contrary, this is exactly what we would expect, given the nature of 
Theon. For what it is for Theon to be is just for Dion to exist and have a certain struc-
ture; a structure that enables Theon to be divided out of him. However, Dion only 
comes to have this structure after the new foot is attached. Therefore, it is only after 
the foot is attached that the conditions on Theon existing come to be satisfied. 
Hence, it is in fact totally unmysterious that Theon is created by the operation. 
 In the terminology of the last section, the point can be put in this way. For Theon 
to exist is for the principle of division ∆T to be applicable to Dion. This principle of 
division, however, is not applicable to Dion prior to the foot being attached. On the 
contrary, it only comes to apply to Dion afterwards. Therefore, it is only once the 
foot is attached that Theon comes to be. For it is only then that the conditions on 
Theon’s existence, as specified by Theon’s real definition, are met. 
 If we adopt this view, then we end up with a unified solution to two structurally 
similar paradoxes. The key is to claim, in each instance, that Theon is a dependent 
part of Dion, which is destroyed in the decrease case and created in the increase case. 
Again, the explanation as to why this is so is that since Theon is dependent part of 
  
Dion, Theon can only exist when Dion has a certain structure. Yet Dion only has this 
structure pre-amputation and post-attachment, and so can exist only at those times.
19
 
 
  Conclusion 
 
Thus, we have seen that in order to defend the interpretation of the paradox of  
decrease set out by Chrysippus, we can appeal to the doctrine of dependent parts. 
The initial trouble with Chrysippus’ view is that it leaves us facing an explanatory 
challenge, viz. that of explaining how a mere extrinsic change could cause a material 
thing to perish. What I have argued is that by appealing to the doctrine of dependent 
parts, this explanatory challenge can be met. Moreover, it has been shown that by 
appealing to the doctrine of dependent parts, we can also offer a compelling solution 
to the related paradox of increase. In this way, we end up with a unified account of 
two structurally similar paradoxes. 
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